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'There is No Alternative' was the recurring refrain from many national governments during the Eurozone crisis, referring to the necessity of austerity and structural reforms. The consequences of the sovereign debt crisis that followed the global financial crisis of 2008 have been felt acutely in many European countries. Yet, in most of Europe, the policy response by the mainstream, on both the left and right, focused on tackling debt rather than reducing unemployment. The external constraints on national governments' room to manoeuvre also became more obvious, especially in the countries facing a sovereign debt crisis. Governments of debtor states were asked to impose severe spending cuts and structural reforms in return for bail-outs from the European Union (EU) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The emergency politics of the crisis dramatically limited the political choices available to citizens (Scharpf 2011; Cramme and Hobolt 2014; Hobolt and Tilley 2014; Laffan 2014 ).
Voters have reacted by rejecting the traditional parties and turning instead to challenger parties. Challenger parties seek to challenge the mainstream political consensus and do not ordinarily enter government. These parties are unconstrained by the responsibilities of government and tend to compete on extreme or "niche" issue positions (Adams, Clark, Ezrow et al. 2006; van der Wardt, De Vries and Hobolt 2014) . There are multiple examples of the success of challengers in the aftermath of the Euro crisis. These include the emergence of new successful challenger parties, such as the Alternative for Germany, the Five Star Movement (Italy) and Podemos (Spain), the surge in support for the established radical right parties across Northern Europe, and notably the election of a radical leftwing Syriza-led government in Greece in 2015.
Why did certain voters defect from mainstream political parties and opt for challenger parties in the aftermath of the crisis? We offer two explanations. The first is rooted in the classic theory of retrospective voting, where voters punish incumbents for poor economic performance. The expectation is that voters will "throw out the rascals" in government when the economy performs poorly. However, given the perception that mainstream parties, whether currently in government or not, were responsible for the economic woes, we expect the sanctioning to extend beyond government parties to all mainstream parties, including those currently in opposition. We thus hypothesize that voters negatively affected by the crisis, e.g. through job loss or reduced earnings, will punish mainstream parties and turn to challenger parties instead.
This retrospective model of economic voting helps to explain the electoral punishment of governing parties during the crisis, but it cannot be the full story. Our second explanation thus focuses on the specific appeal of different challenger parties. Our argument is that defectors choose challenger parties because they offer a rejection of, and an alternative to, the mainstream response to the crisis. Whereas the mainstream left and right have converged on a policy of austerity and an adherence to the fiscal policy-making guidelines of the EU, successful challenger parties have sought to offer clear alternatives. On the left, challenger parties reject the austerity agenda and are critical of the EU's insistence of reduced government welfare spending. On the right, the focus is on the desire to reclaim national sovereignty, specifically to control immigration and repatriate powers from the EU. In both cases, challenger parties reject the "there is no alternative" argument and instead claim that national governments can control their own destiny and offer distinct policies.
To test these propositions we examine who defected from mainstream West European parties after the onset of the crisis. First, we track the changes in the success of challenger parties since the beginning of the crisis and show that there has been a sharp increase in support across Western Europe after 2010. Then we use the 2014 European Election Study to show that retrospective economic voting matters to people's decision to defect from the mainstream to challenger parties: people who were personally adversely affected by the crisis 4 are more likely to defect. Crucially, we demonstrate that voters not only punish parties in government, but also mainstream opposition parties. Defection is most likely when individuals are disconnected from mainstream party policy, not least regarding three issues that are closely tied to the EU and the Euro crisis: EU integration, austerity measures and immigration. We conclude by discussing whether the rise of challenger parties is likely to be a temporary blip due to the crisis or a more permanent feature of West European politics.
Fleeing the centre
The financial crisis that erupted in late 2008 vividly demonstrated both the interconnectedness of financial markets and the increasingly limited power of national governments. As the financial turmoil travelled from the US to Europe, it evolved into a sovereign debt crisis. By 2012, eight out of 28 EU member states had received some form of financial bailout (Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Portugal, Romania and Spain). In return for these credit arrangements by the EU, jointly with the IMF, the debtor countries had to engage in significant fiscal retrenchment and structural reforms, mainly to social welfare programmes. The economic and social consequences of the crisis within the EU have been far-reaching with high levels of unemployment and low levels of growth. This situation was worst in debtor countries in Southern Europe, notably in Greece, Spain and Portugal, where a quarter of the workforce were unable to find a job in 2014, 1 whereas other countries such as
Germany enjoyed a considerable current account surplus and relatively low levels unemployment. The contrast with the reluctantly provided rescue credit to debtor states under rigid 'conditionalities' formulated by the EU/IMF/ECB 'Troika' is stark (Scharpf 2014) .
Looming over these unpopular decisions by certain national governments were the constraints that European integration has imposed. Even in areas at the very heart of state 1 Source: Eurostat (seasonally adjusted figures from May 2014).
power, namely fiscal policy-making, national governments looked impotent (Laffan 2014 (Meguid 2008; Wagner 2012; van der Wardt et al. 2014) .
A variety of terms have been used to describe such parties that challenge the mainstream, including "niche parties" (Meguid 2008; Adams et al. 2006; Jensen and Spoon 2010) , "challenger parties" (Hino 2012; van der Wardt et al. 2014) , "populist parties" (Mudde 2007; Pauwel 2012; Kriesi 2014) and "new politics parties" (Poguntke 1987) . Regardless of nomenclature, all these authors focus on parties that defy existing patterns of party competition by rejecting the traditional economic dimension of politics and mobilizing on new issues or adopting more extreme positions on existing issues. In the case of populist parties, this also involves a more wholesale rejection of the existing "corrupt" elite and the claim that they alone are the true voice of the people (Canovan 1999; Mudde 2007; Kriesi 2014 ).
Not surprisingly, there is no consensus on how to define or measure such parties in the literature. As an example, niche parties have become one of the most used labels in the literature (see e.g. Meguid 2005 Meguid , 2006 Adams et al. 2006; Jensen and Spoon 2010; Wagner 2012 ), yet there is no agreement on the actual distinction between niche and mainstream.
Some studies define niche parties as those that reject the traditional class-based orientation of politics, raise novel issues (Meguid 2005 (Meguid , 2008 , and "compete primarily on a smaller number of non-economic issues" (Wagner 2011) . Others propose a more inclusive definition where niche parties represent "either an extreme ideology (such as Communist and extreme nationalist parties) or noncentrist "niche" ideology (i.e. the Greens)" (Adams et al. 2006: 513) .
This paper also seeks to identify parties that challenge the mainstream party political consensus, but we adopt a novel approach to the measurement that focuses on participation in government. We argue that measuring whether or not parties ordinarily participate in government has the advantage that it indirectly captures many of the features of niche and populist parties (the mobilization of new issues and/or extreme positions on existing issues as well as the rejection of the political establishment), yet with greater parsimony and simplicity than measuring what qualifies as "niche", "populist" or "extreme". Moreover, it highlights an important aspect of challenger parties that is not captured by existing classifications, namely the degree to which a party has government responsibility for political outcomes for which they can be held to account.
Hence, in our classification, mainstream parties are those parties that frequently alternate between government and opposition. Their policy platforms are likely to be affected by both their past experience in office and their desire to enter office again. In the eyes of voters, such parties find it difficult to escape responsibility for prolonged crises, such as the Eurozone crisis. By their very nature, mainstream parties, in opposition and in office, are also more cautious in mobilizing around new issues or adopting positions far from other parties, since both would make it more difficult to enter into coalition government (Tavits 2008; van der Wardt et al. 2014; Hobolt and de Vries 2015 We define three types of challenger party. All three types are parties that were not part of any national-level government in the 30 years preceding the Euro crisis . 4 We also use the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) to distinguish between right-wing and left-wing challenger parties (Bakker et al. 2015) , using the general left-right question in CHES: "Please tick the box that best describes each party's overall ideology on a scale ranging from 0 linked to people's experiences during the crisis. To answer this question, we need to examine the motivations of voters who defected from the mainstream to challenger parties over the last few years.
We argue this type of defection is, at least in part, determined by the economic crisis, and the governmental response to the crisis. The choice to defect to a challenger party is about sanctioning and selection (Banks and Sundaram, 1993; Fearon 1999) . If we understand elections as mechanisms for political accountability, then they must function as a sanctioning device in which voters reward or punish incumbents on the basis of past performance (Key 1966; Fiorina 1981; Manin 1997; Powell 2000) . This is the core intuition of the economic voting model, which suggests that voters punish governments for bad economic performance and reward them for good performance (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000; Nannestad and
Paldam 1994). In times of crisis, we would thus expect governments to be more likely to be thrown out of office. Bartels' (2013) However, the pocketbook voting model does not in and of itself explain why voters turn to challenger parties rather than to other mainstream parties in opposition. Voters do not see elections as simply sanctioning devices, but also as opportunities to choose a political representative with the right set of preferences and qualities (Besley, 2005; Fearon, 1999) . This is about the prospective selection of specific parties, rather than retrospective sanctioning of the government. Our argument is that the convergence among mainstream parties during the crisis has led to defection to challenger parties from people who are dissatisfied with that consensus. During the crisis, the mainstream consensus was based on a shared acceptance of fiscal austerity deference to the discretionary authority of the EU (Scharpf 2014; White 2014) . While challenger parties are united in the fact that they offer an alternative to established mainstream policies and often mobilize new issues, they differ significantly in their focus. H2b: People who strongly favour more economic redistribution are more likely to defect from mainstream parties to a left wing challenger party.
Explaining defection from the mainstream
As Figure 1 shows challenger parties have become increasingly important components of party systems across Western Europe, especially in the aftermath of the crisis.
Our analysis here focuses on the questions of why some people have defected from mainstream parties, of left and right, and lent their support to these various challenger parties.
To do this we analyse the 2014 European Election Study (EES), which is ideally suited to examine individual level motivations for defection as it asks identical questions of vote intention, vote recall, financial situation and policy preferences of representative samples of voters all EU member states (Schmitt et al. 2015) . 8 We focus on why certain individuals have switched support between parties over the electoral cycle in different countries in Western
Europe. Specifically we look at people that previously cast a vote for a mainstream party in the last national election, but by 2014 supported a challenger party. Before looking at the reasons behind defection, it is important to note how defection from the mainstream has been crucial to challenger party success on both the left and right. Challenger parties pick up support from both mainstream parties and from previous nonvoters. Almost half of support for challenger parties is due to defection from the mainstream or mobilization from non-voting. But that does not mean that defection is that common. In total about 9 per cent of people who voted previously and now express a vote intention switch from the mainstream to the challengers (there are only 1 per cent that switch the other way).
While that is not a huge proportion of the electorate, it is a proportion that has transformed challenger parties from insignificant to significant players. That raises the question of what makes those people switch. Why has a tenth of the electorate turned their back on mainstream parties?
As discussed above there are two major drivers of electoral behaviour: sanctioning and selection. Our argument is that both sanctioning on the basis of economic experiences determines and selection on the basis of policy preferences determines whether people defect.
Our dependent variable is thus defection. We restrict our analysis to those individuals who supported mainstream parties in the previous national election and we see what factors made people more or less likely to defect, in terms of supporting a different party today, to challenger parties.
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To capture sanctioning and selection, we use two sets of independent variables.
Economic sanctioning is modelled by including a measure that captures how the crisis affected individuals financially. This consists of two questions. The first asks whether the respondent, or someone in their household, lost their job over the last two years. The second asks whether the respondent's household saw a decrease in income over the last two years.
We add up the number of adverse impacts, so people who said their income decreased and someone lost their job score 2, people that just mention one adverse impact score 1 and people that mention neither score zero. 48 per cent of people in the 17 Western European states score zero, 32 per cent score 1 and 20 per cent score 2.
To capture selection based on policy preferences, we use a series of 11 point policy scales. These concern the redistribution of wealth, raising taxes to spend more on public services, restricting immigration, furthering European integration and the trade-off between environmental protection and economic growth. 10 We have recoded these so that the more 9 One issue is the coding of non-voters. We have excluded all people who refused to answer the previous vote question (9 per cent of respondents) but included 'don't knows' (2 per cent of respondents) as non-voters along with the 23 per cent of people who stated that they did not vote previously. In terms of current party support, we include anyone who did not give a party name as a non-voter, including people who answered 'don't know', did not give an answer, and people who specifically said that they would not vote. In total this includes 32 per cent of respondents. The only difference we make in terms of coding challenger party support is to categorise support of very minor parties that fail to make the 1 per cent threshold that we applied to the aggregate data.
10 Respondents were asked on the extent to which they agreed/ disagreed with the following statements on an 11-point scale: 'You are fully in favour of the redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor'; 'You are fully in favour of raising taxes to increase public services'; 'You are fully in favour of a restrictive policy on immigration', 'The EU should have more authority over the EU Member States' economic and budgetary policies'; 'Environmental protection should always take priority even at the cost of economic growth'.
'right-wing' responses are higher numbers. This means that high scores indicate that a person is against redistribution, against increasing taxes, against further European integration, favours economic growth over environmental protection, and favour restricting immigration further.
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We include a number of demographic variables in the models: age, occupational social class, religiosity, sex, education, citizenship and trade union membership. 12 We also include political interest as an important control when looking at switches to non-voting, this is measured on a 1-4 scale from not interested to very interested. Finally, we include a series of dummy variables for each country (fixed-effects) to control for country effects. 11 We have also recoded 'don't know' responses to the mid points of the scale (6) in order to maximise the number of cases included in the models. Don't knows make up 4-5 per cent of the responses, and including them in this way makes no material difference to the results. 12 The occupational social class categories are self-employed, managerial, professional, white-collar worker, skilled manual worker, unskilled manual worker, student, unemployed and out of the labour force. Education is based on terminal age of education and consists of three categories: education finished before 16, education finished before 19, education finished at 20 or over. Religiosity is measured using church attendance divided into four categories: weekly, monthly, yearly and never. Age is measured in years, trade union members are distinguished from non-members and citizens are distinguished from non-citizens. Figure 2 shows the rates of defection from mainstream parties in government and in opposition for people who experienced no negative economic effects compared to those in households that experienced both unemployment and declining income. Positive numbers indicate that parties attract more voters negatively affected by the crisis.
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
The left hand figure shows how defection rates differ by economic circumstance for people who previously supported a governing party. There is clearly an effect of poor economic circumstances on defection to mainstream opposition parties, they get more defectors from those severely affected by the crisis. But so do challenger parties. In fact the effect on defection to challengers is greater. More importantly though, the right hand figure shows defection from mainstream opposition parties given different economic experiences. In contrast to classic economic voting models, we find that adverse experiences generate more defection to challengers from people who previously voted for mainstream opposition parties even though those mainstream parties are not in government. These are fairly sizable effects as well. The average defection rate from both mainstream governing and opposition parties to challengers is about 25 per cent (given the specific type of person described in the figures).
Moving from good to poor economic experiences thus makes a substantial difference to the possibility of defection.
Hence, there is evidence of economic sanctioning and support for our first hypothesis, but on what basis do voters decide which party to select? Table 4 shows the coefficients from a multinomial logit model that predicts defection from mainstream parties (both in government and in opposition) to the three different types of challenger party and also to nonvoting. It is first worth noting that all four types of defector are more likely to have directly experienced economic problems. Interestingly, the question of which specific party they defected to is not affected by the impact of the economic crisis; the size of the economic effect is rather similar across all four types of defector. How do we explain which specific party these defectors turn to?
In line with our second set of hypotheses (H2a and H2b), table 4 likely to defect to challenger left parties. This is also the case for challenger green parties, although unsurprisingly the best policy predictor is support for environmental protection.
Finally the best predictor of people who become non-voters is not ideology, but political interest. While political interest appears to have little effect on defection from mainstream to challenger parties, it is the politically uninterested that leave mainstream parties and exit the system altogether.
14 FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 14 Table A1 in the Appendix shows similar models that look at mobilisation from non-voting to voting for the different party types. The results here echo, albeit more weakly, the same processes that we see for defection from mainstream parties. Moreover, as we might expect mobilised voters are more politically interested than those that stay non-voters, but there are no real differences in how political interest affects mobilisation to different types of party.
These effects are not trivial. This raises the question of whether the success of challenger parties is a fleeting phenomenon that will dissipate as the economy improves, or whether it is the beginning of a new type of party politics in Western Europe. The crisis, and the mainstream party response to it, has facilitated the success of challenger parties, but it is not clear that the demand for such parties will simply disappear as economic conditions improve. Voters are less partisan than they were and more disillusioned with the established political class and this will continue to add to the appeal of challenger parties. Nonetheless, much will depend on how parties, both mainstream and challenger, respond to the changing political landscape. Some successful challenger parties choose to eventually enter government. If such stints in office are more than passing, these parties are likely to be held to account for the decisions and compromises taken in office, and this is likely to diminish their appeal to many of their current supporters. Such challenger parties may cease to be "challengers" and become part of the mainstream. The example of the Syriza-led government in Greece shows how government responsibility can force challenger parties closer to the mainstream consensus.
Equally, much of the appeal of challenger parties during the crisis was that mainstream parties were perceived to offer very similar positions on important issues relating to the economy, Europe and immigration. Hence, the continued success of challenger parties will also depend on the policy choices offered by the mainstream. Note: Percentages less than 1% are not shown here. The 'None' category includes people who said they did not vote, or were not intending to vote, people that didn't know how they voted, or how they were intending to vote, and people who refused to give a response to the question. Table 3 
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